Barry Scheck Reviews Au Pair Trial

For three weeks last month, the eyes of the world were focused on a small courtroom in Massachusetts. Louise Woodward, a 19 year-old from Britain, stood accused of murdering a child she was caring for as an Au Pair. The case gained notoriety when the evidence the prosecution was building up came out in the press and included accusations that the victim, 3 year-old Matthew Eappen, was killed by shaken-baby-syndrome (SBS). At the center of Woodward's defense team was YU professor Barry Scheck, who teaches at the Cardozo School of Law, and gained national prominence with his work on the O. J. Simpson defense team.

Days after the surprise conviction and judicial ruling ending the case, Scheck spoke to Cardozo students about the significance of the case and some of the details that he felt the students could learn from as they pursued their future careers as lawyers.

Scheck described how England received its first up-close view of the American justice system and found the differences in comparison to their own system startling. In Britain, no cameras are allowed into courtrooms and the public never receives a glimpse of a trial. Pre-trial press coverage is severely restricted in the U.K. so that nobody can pre-judge a case until it is presented in court. In the Woodward trial, only the lawyers involved in the case were under a judge-issued gag order. Footage was broadcast directly from the courtroom and the press and pundits were free to speculate as they wished. This situation immediately brought a chorus of protest from across the Atlantic caused by fears that Woodward could never receive a fair trial. Scheck explained that instead of negatively influencing public opinion, the American system actually worked to favor Louise because the cameras following the trial inside the court allowed the public to see the evidence presented by the defense team. These cameras are what helped shift public opinion to the side of Woodward in the days following the jury's verdict to convict.

Scheck addressed three issues relevant to the case itself. The first involved a controversial decision not to allow the jury to consider charges less severe than second-degree murder. The defense team went for broke and lost. The jury convicted Woodward of murder, with one juror commenting, "I couldn't let her off scott-free, she deserves some punishment."

Scheck said that this statement was important because it showed that "the jury did not really believe she committed murder," but they were left with no other option to punish Woodward, and therefore opted for a murder conviction. Some commentators sugg ested the possibility that the defense chose an all-or-nothing strategy because it served the interests of the people paying the legal bills, E.F. Au Pair, the company that hired Woodward. Critics argued, that during the civil trial that would certainly f ollow, a conviction on any criminal charge, even a lesser charge of manslaughter, would increase the liability of E.F. Au Pair. By eliminating the possibility of receiving a lesser charge conviction, the company would be protected. However, the only optio n left, a murder conviction, would have been disastrous for Woodward with its mandatory life sentence.

Scheck stressed that the decision to eliminate the consideration of lesser included charges "was a [Woodward] family decision," and that an independent lawyer had been appointed to the defense team to ensure that there would be no conflict of interest with the company that would hinder the defense of their client.

The second aspect of the trial addressed by Scheck was a unique aspect of jury trials in Massachusetts. Sixteen people are chosen before the trial to act as a jury. They all hear the evidence and arguments, and only when the trial is over and the delib erations are about to begin are four people randomly chosen to be alternates. The remaining twelve are sent away to deliberate the case and render judgment.

The defense in the Woodward trial had placed four people on the jury with advanced education and a comfortable background in science. The defense's case depended crucially on the ability of the jury to understand the scientific evidence and the experts presenting it. However, as the bailiff called out the alternate jurors the color drained from Scheck's face. All four of the defense's highly rated jurors were eliminated from the jury and declared alternates. Had the defense known the actual make-up of the jury, they might have tailored their case to people without a science background, especially while the prosecutors appealed to the jury to ignore the "high-falootin" charts and experts. The jury did just that when they returned a guilty verdict.

Finally, Scheck addressed the final outcome of the case, the reduction of the verdict by Judge Hiller Zobel to Involuntary Manslaughter. As the judge reviews a verdict he has two jobs. The first is known as Required Findings. The judges in the jurisdic tion of the state of Massachusetts "must give every inference to the prosecution and every adverse inference to the defense witnesses." If the verdict is supported when the judge takes every piece of prosecution evidence at face value and eliminates every piece of defense evidence that the prosecution contests, the judge has fulfilled the Required Findings. In this case the required findings were met to support the guilty verdict.

Yet, the second job of the judge is to provide an Interest of Justice Ruling. This ruling is known as "judge structured discretion," because the judge actually decides that a reasonable view of the evidence presented at trial is so different than the o ne accepted by the jury, that it may lead to a "grave injustice" if the jury verdict is carried out.

In the Woodward case, as Scheck tells it, "the judge accepted our science and rejected theirs." Meaning the judge felt that a reasonable view of the evidence supported the defense theory and that in fact there "was no impact" that caused Matthew Eappen to suffer from a brain hemmhorage.

Due to this reasonable view of the evidence, the judge felt that he had to prevent the "grave injustice" of convicting Woodward of murder and sentencing her to life in prison. His acceptance of the defense theory led him to reduce the conviction to inv oluntary manslaughter, by accepting the jury's finding of "rough" handling and concluding that it started a rebleeding of a previous injury which led to Matthew's death.

"This is the only case I've lost in front of a jury where I couldn't understand the reason for losing," said Scheck. "It was the lowest moment I've ever had as a professional."

Yet, thankfully for Scheck, the judge exonerated both his strategy and his client.