The Intifada: Lessons for Today

Weinberger Speaks to YC Students

The Intifada, the Palestinian popular uprising of 1987-92, reshaped traditional Israeli military thinking and political attitudes, and continues to exert influence over the current Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In light of this, the implications of the Intifada should be taken into serious consideration by Israel in determining her policy toward Israeli/Palestinian territorial concerns, suggested Dr. Naomi Weinberger in the second of a series of talks presented by The Middle East Society. The lectures are intended to sensitize Yeshiva University's undergraduate students to Middle Eastern issues.

Yishai Fleisher, president and founder of the society, states that his goal is to "bring home Middle Eastern issues into something tangible for YU students." Dr. Weinberger, professor of political science at YU and Columbia University, offered a penetrating and thorough analysis of the events leading up to the Intifada, its immediate and long term impact on Israeli/Palestinian society, and its message for today. Weinberger focused on the military, moral, and political dilemmas that the Intifada poses for Israel.

The Israeli military, known as the IDF (Israel Defense Force), overconfident about its capabilities due to its impressive victory and substantial territorial gains during the Six Day War, was left stupefied by its inability to suppress the Palestinian uprising. The IDF's "acknowledged failure to cope with the challenges posed by the Intifada led to a lot of soul searching," explained Weinberger.

As a result, "the Intifada triggered a psychological turning point for the IDF, "providing impetus for a hitherto nonexistent military policy. Yitzhak Rabin's thinking best exemplified this emerging attitude." Rabin, who was then the Defense Minister in Yitzhak Shamir's Likud Government, began by advocating a policy of "force, might, and beatings" but soon realized its ineffectiveness and subsequently adopted a more dovish approach. The IDF followed suit.

The moral dilemmas posed by the Intifada further contributed to this emerging attitude. The prospect of having to forcibly expel Palestinian civilians from their homes made the Israelis more willing to take on a conciliatory stance. According to Weinberger, these transfers "represent a hyperactive yetzer hara of the extremist right; a perverse and chauvinistic nationalism inconsistent with Jewish ethical values. It would mean that Jews, historically victims of the Gentile oppressors would become victimizers."

Weinberger explained that while its rumblings were taking an unsettling toll on the Israeli military and psyche, the Intifada's most seismic shocks were felt in the political arena. The Israeli radical right, which was wary of the leftward shifting attitude of the body politic, was on the defensive. Settlers turned to vigilantism while the hard-handed policy advocated by the right was spurring international criticism and jeopardizing U.S. aid and support. Extremists became more willing to employ undemocratic means to achieve their security and idealistic goals, epitomized by the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995.

But what contemporary lessons are we to learn from the crisis? Weinberger invoked the principle of kal va-homer: "If it was difficult to suppress the Intifada in the circumstances of the late 1980's, kal va-homer it would be difficult - even more difficult - to suppress a popular Palestinian uprising of the late 1990's." The main reason for this, Weinberger contends, is that the expectations the Palestinians have of their future territorial acquisitions have been raised due to the gains they made through the Oslo Accords.

Weinberger warned that the threat of a Palestinian popular uprising is no illusion. She directed the attention of the listeners to the May 4, 1999 deadline, the date by which the five-year transitional period dictated by the Oslo Accords is to be complete. Yassir Arafat has warned that if by that date no negotiated settlement is reached by the Israelis and Palestinians, he will unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood.

Weinberger asserted that if a settlement cannot be reached by the upcoming deadline and Arafat follows through with his threat, confrontation is virtually unavoidable. "Israel's choices are not between good and better but between bad and worse," concluded Dr. Weinberger. It is not only necessary to avoid war but absolutely imperative for the Israelis to make peace, not only with the Palestinians, but also with each other.

This, in Weinberger's view, requires a return to the attitude prevalent when Israel was still a fledgling state and which continued as the modus vivendi until the Intifada. Then, the Likud party was more willing to sacrifice the fulfillment of some of its idealistic goals for the benefit of internal peace. Weinberger suggests that the Israelis deal with the Palestinians in a similar way.

While acknowledging that the Palestinians are unreliable, Dr. Weinberger asserted that it is much more risky to sacrifice peace than it is to compromise. With this perspective, unrealistic demands should not be made of the Palestinians. A civil discourse should be maintained by Israelis with the Palestinians, but more importantly, amongst themselves.

Weinberger concluded that "the overall message is clear, incorporating the lessons of the Intifada and of Israel's history in general: We need to have better dialogue among Jews before we can even begin to negotiate effectively with the other side."