Volume 67, Issue 3

Iraq: Peace for a While
Avi Narrow-Tilonsky

Despite President Bush’s conviction that we must attack Saddam Hussein, some difficulties have arisen from the hasty planning that has given rise to the government’s aggressive foreign policy.  In my opinion, the most valid objections that can be levied against the “American” plan are lack of patience, presentation, and unity of thought on the part of the United States.

Most of the European nations, which are not excessively friendly with Iraq, do not call for immediate war as our government does.  They feel that it would be wiser to reinstate United Nations inspections that would monitor Iraq’s weapons and presumably its disarmament.  Unfortunately, many in our panic-stricken American society disregard this proposition as the brainchild of a cowardly European continent that may be pandering to the Arab nations in deference to their oil-fueled authority.  They do not consider the traditional American drive to improve upon the European society that once bore our youthful nation a possible mechanism for implementation of a program of third party weapons regulation.  The American, non-conventional, inventiveness could perhaps produce an effective, or at least theoretically effective, inspections program that would make the suggestion of renewed UN inspections less ludicrous than they sound now, coming from European nations that are not directly physically challenged by Iraqi aggression.  With this in mind maybe the American public should give a newly revamped, aggressively controlled program a try as opposed to calling for immediate action that will produce dramatic results.

The second issue that suggests the benefit of holding off on full-scale military action at this point, presentation, is twofold.  The Bush administration has been ineffective in convincing possible coalition partners to join as well as placing Saddam Hussein in a position to avert all out war. Up to the current day, governmental disclosures have been sketchy, secretive, and emotionally attractive yet not clearly disclosed in a way that would convince foreign governments of the sinister and malicious character of the Hussein Regime.  Only Great Britain is completely convinced of the immediate necessity of all out war.  The second effect that this war speech is having is that it backs Saddam Hussein into a corner.  Because of the threatening tone that has been emanating from Washington, Saddam Hussein is no longer left with many options that he sees as being reasonable.  He has already offered to allow unfettered UN inspection of his country.  The only thing that he can still do is to allow inspectors access to his royal institutions, which he has been reluctant to allow.  This scenario may play itself soon as Saddam feels the US pressure and the need to accede more and more to our demands in order to avoid “regime change.”  In the event that this war expands from a war of words to one of ground forces and tanks, Saddam Hussein would have nothing to lose and after having been pressured into this war by American anger and fear.  Had the administrative presentation been more subdued and expectant of cooperation, we might have more options at this point.

The third issue that presents a difficulty at present and could be solved with a postponement of war action is the lack of unity both amongst the not-yet-existent coalition, that we wish we could form, and amongst the American people. Many European nations and possibly even a few timid or Westerly sympathizing Arab nations could be brought aboard the American coalition after a period of calculated American diplomacy. Additionally, an informed public, in this country, might be more in favor of strong measures against Iraq and cause fewer domestic problems if a conflict were to ensue. Carrying out a period of  “education” could greatly improve the  American position and perhaps even scare Saddam Hussein into a never before seen level of cooperation. All of the aforementioned negative effects can be reduced through the governmental disclosure of condemning evidence and a more expectant yet less aggressive tone in public declarations of enmity between the United States and Iraq that would make the government seem less rash and more measured in its response. What might follow would be a trial period of unfettered UN inspections, and strong regulations with powerful ramifications for disobedience placed on Saddam personally as well as on his regime as a whole. Despite the seemingly clear eventuality of war with Iraq, due to Saddam Hussein’s irresponsible intractable nature, a delay in the war plans may gain international and domestic support or at least acceptability for our war plan reduce the global risks inherently associated with it, and maybe even avoid a costly conflict by scaring Saddam into behaving himself

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